Inmunidad a un error de identificación: el problema del estrechamiento

Abstract

This paper explores a solution to the problem of a narrowing of the scope of immunity to error through misidentification. It is the challenge of leaving out propioception-based self-ascriptions, among others. In Coliva’s framework, these judgments are immune because there is not an identification as part of the thinker’s rational grounds. The problem is that there seems to be judgments without any significant immunity which also satisfy Coliva’s criterion. Here I propose that, in spite of appearances, these challenging cases do involve an identification from the rational perspective of the thinker. However, such an identification is not the premise of a conscious inference but an implicit reason a thinker would appeal to if he were requested to justify his final judgment.

Keywords:

Primera persona

identificación

inmunidad

estrechamiento

Annalisa Coliva

First-person

identification

immunity

narrowing

Annalisa Coliva

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