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Flórez Quintero, D. T. . (2018). Is non-conceptualiSm a form of the myth of the given?. Discusiones Filosóficas, 19(33), 57–70. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2018.19.33.5
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Abstract
In this paper I shall examine whether noconceptualism is a form of the Myth of the Given and I shall argue that perceptions, even if their content is non-conceptual, belong to the “space of reasons”. I shall hold that perceptual experiences legitimately belong to the logical space of reasons iff they meet the following three conditions: (i) they have semantic content, (ii) they are rule-governed, and (iii) they have some properties such that, due to their nature, one could say that when a perceptual experience satisfies them, it constitutes a reason to believe something.
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References
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---. Experience, Thought and Activity: their content, their normativity and their characteristic kinds of commitment. Longer version from that published in York Gunther. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002. Print.
---. Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content. En: Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Gunther. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002. Print.
Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Berkeley: University of California, 1983. Print.
Evans, Gareth. The Varieties of Reference. Ed. John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Print.
Haugeland, John. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998. Print.
Heck, Richard. “Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"”. The Philosophical Review 109.4 (2000): 483-523. Web.
Kelly, Sean. “The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXII.3 (2001): 601-608. Web.
McDowell, John. Having the world in view: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. Print.
---. Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. Print.
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Minessota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1956): 253-329. Web.
