Creer en el innatismo de ciertas estructuras cerebrales tiene consecuencias sociales negativas

Abstract

Mirror neurons are a special class of visuomotor neurons originally discovered in the F5 area of the macaque brain by a group of neuroscientists from the University of Parma (Gallese et al., Rizzolatti et al.). Since their discovery, mirror neurons have been postulated as the neurophysiological basis for understanding actions and a mechanism for imitation, although macaques do not have the ability to imitate. In humans, mirror neurons are believed to be responsible for social communication in a broad sense (from empathic apprehension and even to language). The cognitive neuroscience community and adjacent disciplines are divided over the exact role they play in social cognition. Although this dispute can only be resolved from empirical evidence, this paper reflects on whether encouraging a belief in the innateness of this neuronal structure increases negative social consequences.

Keywords:

Neuronas espejo

mecanismo innato

aprendizaje asociativo

cognición social

filosofía experimental

Mirror neurons

innate mechanism

associative learning

social cognition

experimental philosophy

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