La arracionalidad y la posibilidad de una teoría unificada de la acción

Abstract

My thesis in this paper is that the phenomenon of collective action, not considering arational elements as the cause of it, requires an explanatory model different from the theories of individual action. In order to defend it, I will fi rst show that there are arational elements in individual action that are part of the cause of it and, second, that in collective action hese elements do not intervene as part of their causes. Therefore, an appropriate theory of individual action is not successful as an explanatory model of collective action and vice versa. That is, it is not possible to construct a single theory of action that satisfactorily explains these two phenomena, namely that of individual action and that of collective action. We need, at least, two different theories of action.

Keywords:

Teoría de la acción

Searle

Bratman

racionalidad

irracionalidad

arracionalidad

Theory of action

Searle

Bratman

rationality

irrationality

arationality

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