Strawson y haack : dos propuestas alternativas y moderadas en la epistemología naturalizada.

Abstract

This article aims to present a characterization of the naturalized epistemology that can be understood as a theory that does not favor either traditional epistemology or scientific epistemology. That is to say, the intention is to show that it is possible to build a bridge between naturalized and traditional epistemology without having to get rid of the conceptual tools of classical epistemology (such as the notion of justification and the a priori element) and, at the same time that it is possible to examine the extent to which the former differs from the latterit or whether we should also deny such conceptual tools. In other words, the objective of this work is to show an alternative naturalized epistemology that does not get rid of the traditional tools of epistemology. Although it is important to make it clear from now on that, despite the fact that this reconciling position between traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology is interesting, the author is not in favor of any of them, so that I could show my own point of view on this subject in an independent work. Here I will limit myself to expose and critically analyze two antecedents on the subject in recent philosophy.

Keywords:

naturalismo liberal

naturalismo aposteriorista

reformista y restringido

epistemología naturalizada

liberal naturalism

aposteriorism

naturalized epistemology

reformist and restricted naturalism

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