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Armour Garb, B., & Woodbridge, J. A. (2012). -. Discusiones Filosóficas, 13(21), 33–63. Recuperado de https://ucaldas.metarevistas.org/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/671
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Referências
Armour-Garb, B. “Deflationism (about theories of truth)”. Philosophical Compass. Apr. 2012: 267-277. Print.
Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge. “Why deflationists should be pretense theorists (and perhaps already are)”. Pedersen, N. and C. Wright (eds.). New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print.
---. “The story about propositions”. Noûs. Dec. 2012: 635-674. Print.
---. “From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming.
---. Pretense and pathology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Forthcoming.
Crimmins, M. “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, pretense, and reference”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 1998: 1-48. Print.
Devitt, M. “The metaphysics of truth”. M. Lynch (ed.). The nature of truth. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 579-611. Print.
Egan, A. “Pretense for the complete idiom”. Noûs. Sep. 2008: 381-409. Print.
Evans, G. “Existential statements”. J. McDowell (ed.). Varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 343-369. Print.
Field, H. “Critical notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth”. Philosophy of Science. Jun. 1992: 321-330. Print.
---. “Deflationist views of meaning and content”. Mind. Jul. 1994: 249-285. Print.
Glymour, Clark. “Conceptual scheming or confessions of a metaphysical realist”. Synthese. May. 1982: 169-180. Print.
Horwich, P. Truth. First edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Print.
---. Truth. Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Print.
Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Print.
Kroon, F. “Characterizing non-existents”. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Jan. 1996: 163-193. Print.
---. “Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity”. Philosophical Studies. Dec. 2001: 197-225. Print.
---. “Descriptivism, pretense, and the Frege-Russell problems”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 2004: 1-30. Print.
---. “Existence in the theory of definite descriptions”. Journal of Philosophy. Jul. 2009: 365-389. Print.
Leeds, S. “Truth, correspondence, and success”. Philosophical Studies. Jul. 1995: 1-36. Print.
Lewis, D. “Putnam’s paradox”. Australian Journal of Philosophy. Oct. 1984: 221-236. Print.
O’Shea, J. Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a normative turn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Print.
Putnam, H. Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Print.
---. “Models and reality”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Sep. 1980: 464-482. Print.
Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Print.
Richard, M. “Semantic pretense”. Everett, A. and T. Hofweber (eds.). Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000. Print.
Schiffer, S. “Language-created, language-independent entities”. Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1996: 149-167. Print.
---. “Pleonastic fregeanism”. A. Kanamori (ed.). Analytical Philosophy and Logic: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6. Ohio: Bowling Green Documentation Center, 2000. 1-15. Print.
Sellars, W. “Truth and ‘Correspondence’”. Journal of Philosophy. Jan. 1962: 29-56. Reprinted in Sellars (1963). 197-224. Print.
---. Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Print.
---. “Language as thought and as communication”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 1969: 506-527. Print.
---. “Meaning as functional classification”. Synthese. Jul. 1974: 417-437. Print.
---. Naturalism and ontology. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1979. Print.
Stanley, J. “Hermeneutic fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy Figurative Language. Dec. 2002: 36-71. Print.
Tarski, A. “The semantic conception of truth”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1944: 341-376. Print.
van Fraassen, B. “Putnam’s paradox: Metaphysical realism revamped and evaded”. Noûs. Jun. 1997: 17-42. Print.
Walton, K. Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print.
Williams, M. “Do We (Epistemologists) need a theory of truth?” Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1986: 223-242. Print.
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. Print.
---. Philosophical investigations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Print.
Woodbridge, J. “Truth as a pretense”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
---. “Propositions as semantic pretense”. Language & Communication. Jul. 2006: 343-355. Print.
Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. “Linguistic puzzles and semantic pretense”. S. Sawyer (ed.). New waves in Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.
Yablo, S. “How in the world?” Philosophical Topics. Apr. 1996: 255-286. Print.
---. “Go figure: A path through fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXV: Figurative Language. Dec. 2001: 72-102. Print.
---. “The myth of the seven”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge. “Why deflationists should be pretense theorists (and perhaps already are)”. Pedersen, N. and C. Wright (eds.). New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print.
---. “The story about propositions”. Noûs. Dec. 2012: 635-674. Print.
---. “From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming.
---. Pretense and pathology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Forthcoming.
Crimmins, M. “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, pretense, and reference”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 1998: 1-48. Print.
Devitt, M. “The metaphysics of truth”. M. Lynch (ed.). The nature of truth. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 579-611. Print.
Egan, A. “Pretense for the complete idiom”. Noûs. Sep. 2008: 381-409. Print.
Evans, G. “Existential statements”. J. McDowell (ed.). Varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 343-369. Print.
Field, H. “Critical notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth”. Philosophy of Science. Jun. 1992: 321-330. Print.
---. “Deflationist views of meaning and content”. Mind. Jul. 1994: 249-285. Print.
Glymour, Clark. “Conceptual scheming or confessions of a metaphysical realist”. Synthese. May. 1982: 169-180. Print.
Horwich, P. Truth. First edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Print.
---. Truth. Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Print.
Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Print.
Kroon, F. “Characterizing non-existents”. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Jan. 1996: 163-193. Print.
---. “Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity”. Philosophical Studies. Dec. 2001: 197-225. Print.
---. “Descriptivism, pretense, and the Frege-Russell problems”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 2004: 1-30. Print.
---. “Existence in the theory of definite descriptions”. Journal of Philosophy. Jul. 2009: 365-389. Print.
Leeds, S. “Truth, correspondence, and success”. Philosophical Studies. Jul. 1995: 1-36. Print.
Lewis, D. “Putnam’s paradox”. Australian Journal of Philosophy. Oct. 1984: 221-236. Print.
O’Shea, J. Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a normative turn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Print.
Putnam, H. Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Print.
---. “Models and reality”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Sep. 1980: 464-482. Print.
Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Print.
Richard, M. “Semantic pretense”. Everett, A. and T. Hofweber (eds.). Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000. Print.
Schiffer, S. “Language-created, language-independent entities”. Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1996: 149-167. Print.
---. “Pleonastic fregeanism”. A. Kanamori (ed.). Analytical Philosophy and Logic: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6. Ohio: Bowling Green Documentation Center, 2000. 1-15. Print.
Sellars, W. “Truth and ‘Correspondence’”. Journal of Philosophy. Jan. 1962: 29-56. Reprinted in Sellars (1963). 197-224. Print.
---. Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Print.
---. “Language as thought and as communication”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 1969: 506-527. Print.
---. “Meaning as functional classification”. Synthese. Jul. 1974: 417-437. Print.
---. Naturalism and ontology. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1979. Print.
Stanley, J. “Hermeneutic fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy Figurative Language. Dec. 2002: 36-71. Print.
Tarski, A. “The semantic conception of truth”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1944: 341-376. Print.
van Fraassen, B. “Putnam’s paradox: Metaphysical realism revamped and evaded”. Noûs. Jun. 1997: 17-42. Print.
Walton, K. Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print.
Williams, M. “Do We (Epistemologists) need a theory of truth?” Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1986: 223-242. Print.
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. Print.
---. Philosophical investigations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Print.
Woodbridge, J. “Truth as a pretense”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
---. “Propositions as semantic pretense”. Language & Communication. Jul. 2006: 343-355. Print.
Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. “Linguistic puzzles and semantic pretense”. S. Sawyer (ed.). New waves in Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.
Yablo, S. “How in the world?” Philosophical Topics. Apr. 1996: 255-286. Print.
---. “Go figure: A path through fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXV: Figurative Language. Dec. 2001: 72-102. Print.
---. “The myth of the seven”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
