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Abstract
In this paper I try to discuss the consistency argument that the inference to the best explanation (hereafter IBE) offers to realism, in particular to scientific realism. My paper will be divided in two parts. In the first one, I try to explain the virtues of realism, relating it to IBE. In other words, I will discuss the arguments of why IBE is important for scientific realism. I also mention some definitions on theories of truth to justify which one is more akin to realism in general. In addition, I will focus on the differences of various levels of realism to show that, at least one of them may be compatible with an anti-realist position, which ultimately is what I defend. In the second part, I offer three replies that can be given to IBE if we interpret it as an argument typical of scientific realism. The first objection is that scientific realists make a category mistake when they talk about observation terms and theoretical entities, the second is that IBE turns out to be a petitio principii, provided it is realistic to use it as an argument, and the third objection is that IBE is not genuinely an argument exclusive of scientific realism, since it may also be compatible with empiricist or instrumentalist views.
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