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Publication Date: 2013-07-01
How to Cite
Miranda Rojas, R. (2013). Identity statements, propositional invariability and contextual stipulation. Discusiones Filosóficas, 14(23), 105–133. Retrieved from https://ucaldas.metarevistas.org/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/738
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Abstract
If two sentences express the same proposition can be understood one as a priori, another as a posteriori; but no one as necessary and the other as contingent. This paper argues that identity statements concerning the same object express the same proposition. The epistemic difference a priori-a posteriori is not an aspect that favors what is here called propositional variability: that two identity statements do not express the same proposition. It argues that they are necessary statements, not contingent ones, so that one way to keep this is the Kripkean notion of rigidity.
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References
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Breckenridge, Wylie and Ofra Magidor. “Arbitrary reference”. Philosophical Studies. 2012: 377-400. Print.
Gallois, André. “Rigid designation and the contingency of identity”. Mind. Jan. 1986: 57-76. Print.
Davidson, Matthew. “Direct reference and singular propositions”. American Philosophical Quarterly. Jul. 2000: 285-300. Print.
Díez, Amparo. “Enunciados de identidad”. Anuario filosófico. Jun. 1988: 135-144. Impreso.
Donnellan, Keith. “Proper names and identifying descriptions”. Synthese. Oct. 1970: 335-358. Print.
Evans, Gareth. “Reference and contingency”. Monist. Apr. 1979: 160–89. Print.
Hughes, Christopher. Kripke: Names, necessity, and identity. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. Print.
Kaplan, David. Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Print.
Kripke, Saul. “Identity and necessity”. Identity and individuation. New York: New York University Press, 1971. Print.
---. Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Print.
Nubiola, Jaime. El compromiso esencialista de la lógica modal: estudio de Quine y Kripke. Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1984. Impreso.
Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. New York: Prometheus Books, 2005. Print.
Soames, Scott. “Incomplete definite descriptions”. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Aug. 1986: 349-375. Print.
---. Beyond rigidity: The unfinished semantic agenda of naming and necessity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.
---. Philosophical Essays. Natural Language: What it means and how we use it. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008. Print.
Stalnaker, Robert. “Reference and necessity”. Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright (eds.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Print.
Stanley, Jason. “Names and rigid designation”. Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright (eds.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Print.
Textor, Mark. “The use theory of meaning and semantic stipulation”. Erkenntnis. May. 2007: 29-45. Print.
