“Necesidad a posteriori, trivialización y sobregeneralización”

Abstract

This paper discusses the plausibility of the admission of general non-natural rigid terms. Theoretical identity statements that include general non-natural rigid terms do not express a posteriori necessity: they are analytical, necessary and a priori statements. Only statements of identity that include general rigid natural terms are statements necessary a posteriori. The problems of trivialization and overgeneralization assume that the application of rigidity to the terms of non-natural kinds, detracts from rigidity as a semantic-modal differentiator, but that is only true if these problems require that any general rigid term allows affirming a posteriori necessity, which is rejected. The nominalization of a general term is proposed as a solution to trivialization and over-generalization. Similarly, a restrictive predicative reading of the general terms is discarded. Finally, the main cases of general non-rigid terms are explained: syntactically complex descriptive terms.

Keywords:

necesidad

a posteriori

trivialización

sobregeneralización

nominalización

término general rígido no natural

necessity

a posteriori

trivialization

overgeneralization

nominalization

non-natural rigid general term

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