Authors
Abstract
This article examines the argument advanced by Fodor to neutralize Quine's problem of referential indeterminacy, showing that there are substantial problems with its premises and the conclusion that it intends to bring forward. Eventually, it will be shown that the mistakes in Fodor's argument indicate that there is a systematic indeterminacy in his semantic theory. Finally, the causes of this referential indetermination, in terms of a conceptual commitment with an extensional criterion identity for perceptual states that his informational semantics supposes, are analyzed.
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References
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