Problemas filosóficos para una teoría de la representación científica

Abstract

In opposition to the skepticism stated by Callender and Cohen regarding the existence of some problem around scientific representation, the objective of this article is to show a set of peculiar, though not exclusive, characteristics of scientific representation that a satisfactory theory should explain. These are: predication, the possibility of being an incorrect representation, surrogate reasoning, and the independence between content and denotation. Furthermore, it is argued that a satisfactory theory of representation should offer a definition of its representational means, that is, of what a scientific model is. Finally, it is proposed that, to account for these characteristics, it is sufficient to answer the question ‘How do scientific models allow gaining information about the represented object?’

Keywords:

Representación científica

modelos científicos

concepción estipulativa

denotación

predicación

razonamiento subrogatorio

Scientific representation

scientific models

stipulative conception

denotation

predication

surrogative reasoning

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