Authors
Abstract
The peace agreement in Colombia was signed in the context of a constitution in force. The transitional justice instruments were implemented in multiple constitutional amendments that produced tensions against the current political regime. One of these constitutional amendments incorporated a special constitutional modification procedure to make the transitional justice process possible. In sentence C-332 of 2017, this constitutional amendment procedure was declared partially unconstitutional. The purpose of this article is to analyze how tensions between the interpretive rigidity of the constitution and transitional change are overcome. Therefore, it is argued that a transition process implies a flexible constitutional identity to adapt the current regime to the demands of transitional justice. The
constitutionality control carried out on the special constitutional amendment procedure can be read as a political control to the peace process and not as a legal control to the amendment procedure.
Keywords:
References
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